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LACK OF MUTUALITY OF REMEDY AT INCEPTION OF
CONTRACT NO BAR TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Gould v. Stelter,
14 Ill.2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958)
Plaintiff sought specific performance when defendant refused to
convey real property under a written contract of sale between himself and
the plaintiff, the latter acting as agent under authority of a power of at-
torney for the principal purchaser. Defendant contended that he could
not be compelled to fulfill the contract because the principal purchaser
was not bound, not having signed nor authorized the plaintiff to sign in
her own name under the power of attorney. The trial court found, in
favor of defendant, that this lack of mutuality precluded a grant of
equitable relief. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, declaring that want
of mutuality at the inception of a contract would not bar an action for
specific performance.
1
The requirement of mutuality of remedy in an action for specific
performance, that plaintiff's own promise must be legally enforceable be-
fore he can enforce the defendant's promise, first received notice in sev-
eral early English cases.2 These cases involved essentially problems of
mutuality of performance; under their particular fact situations there was
no assurance that plaintiff would perform if the performance of the de-
fendant were compelled. From them, however, Lord Justice Fry, in
1858, formulated his rigorous rule' of mutuality of remedy at the incep-
tion of the contract. The theory of Fry's doctrine was that equality is
equity, and perfect equality demands that the same equitable remedies be
equally available to both parties to the contract.
At first the courts generally accepted this rule, apparently confusing
the problems of mutuality of remedy, mutuality of performance and
mutuality of obligation.4 It became evident, however, that a strict applica-
tion of the doctrine often resulted in inequitable and unduly harsh de-
cisions. The courts consequently developed exceptions to the rule, which
1 Gage v. Cummings, 209 II. 170, 70 N.E. 679 (1904) and Wlocyewski v.
Kozlowski, 395 II1. 402, 70 N.E.2d 560 (1947) are overruled so far as they are
based upon a supposed want of mutuality.
2 Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298, 38 Eng. Rep. 817 (1828) (minor); Hamilton
v. Grant, 3 Dow. 33, 3 Eng. Rep. 980 (1815) (personal services); Lawrence
v. Butler, 1 Sch. & Lef. 13 (1807) (minor).
3 "A contract to be specifically enforced by the court must, as a general
rule, be mutual, that is to say, such that it might at the time it was entered
into, have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them."
FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE § 287 (1st ed. 1858).
4 See, e.g., Barker v. Hauberg, 325 II. 538, 156 N.E. 806 (1927) ; Ulrey v.
Keith, 237 IIl. 284, 86 N.E. 696 (1908); Gage v. Cummings, supra note 1;
Hutcheson v. Heirs of McNutt, I Ohio 14 (1821); Steel v. Murphy, 10 Ohio
App. 150 (1918).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
became so numerous that they eventually swallowed the rule itself.5
It could no longer be said that the doctrine of mutuality of remedy was
the prevailing law. Fry's rule has been rejected by legal scholars as harsh
and oppressive,6 and either expressly or in essence repudiated in the ma-
jority of jurisdictions.'
Ames' attempted to formulate a more satisfactory rule in 19038
His rule, though an improvement, was still overly rigid in requiring strict
mutuality of performance. The courts could not compel the defendant
to perform unless they could compel the performance of the plaintiff.
This would leave the courts powerless in situations where it might be de-
sirable to compel defendant's performance even though the plaintiff's
performance is not specifically enforceable.9
In Gould, the Illinois court, recognizing that a strict application of
the mutality of remedy doctrine would be unfair in balancing the equi-
ties of the parties, has adopted the rule of the majority of the states. If
one who suffers from a breach of contract has no adequate remedy at
law, yet has performed or the court is assured he will perform, he should
not be denied equitable relief because of lack of mutuality of remedy at
the inception of the contract. The granting of specific performance will,
under this rule, be founded upon a more realistic mutuality of perform-
ance, the court granting the discretionary relief when it appears, at the
time of the suit, that the defendant will receive the agreed exchange and
that no injustice or hardship will inure to him as a result of the decree.
Such assurance that the plaintiff will perform may be found by the
court in the acts or conduct of the plaintiff, or in the power of the court
to require bond or issue a conditional decree.'" Mr. Justice Cardozo de-
r See, e.g., Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 Ill. 264, 38 N.E.2d 170 (1941); Ullsper-
ger v. Meyer, 217 Ill. 262, 75 N.E. 482 (1905). See also Ames, Mutuality in
Specific Performance, 3 CoLum. L. Ray. 1 (1903) (eight exceptions); CLARK,
EouITy § 175 (1954) (ten exceptions).
6 See, e.g., Ames, supra note 5; Langdell, Equity, Specific Performance,
Mutuality of Remedy, 1 HARV. L. REv. 104- (1887); Cook, The Present Status
of the Lack of Mutuality Rule, 36 YALE L. J. 897 (1927); Durfee, Mutuality in
Specific Performance, 20 MICH. L. REv. 289 (1922); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1433 (rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 372 (1932).
7 Fuchs v. United Motor State Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939).
See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 508, 572 (1952), which states that only five states follow
the doctrine.
8 "Equity will not compel specific performance by a defendant if, after per-
formance, the common law remedy of damages would be his sole security for
the performance of the plaintiff's side of the contract." Ames, supra note 5 at 2.
9 It fails to cover situations where plaintiff's promise is for personal services,
though because of vast expenditures and preparation on his part it appears to the
court he will perform. Zelleken v. Lynch, 80 Kan. 746, 104 Pac. 563 (1909);
it also fails to cover situations involving personal services or output agreements
which contain negative covenants. Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegal-Cooper Co.,
157 N.Y. 60, 51 N.E. 408 (1898).
10 City of LaFollette v. LaFolette Water Co., 252 Fed. 762 (6th Cir. 1918);
1959]
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scribes the court's role in balancing the equities as one of "exact (ing) to-
day as a condition of relief . . .the assurance that the decree, if rendered,
will operate without injustice or oppression to plaintiff or defendant ...
Mutuality of remedy is important in so far only as its presence is essential
to the attainment of that end.""
J. K. Skomp
Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Transp. Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 Fed. 603
(7th Cir. 1917) ; Fuchs v. Motor Stage Inc., 62 Ohio App. 20 (1939) (aff'd, supra
note 7, without discussion on this point). See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 1440
(rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 373 comment (b) (1932).
11 Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 494, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (1922).
